

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03288 01 OF 02 021357Z
ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03288

EXDIS

USSALT TWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 2, 1978
(SALT TWO-1644)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
EARLE AT SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 2, 1978:

- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR EARLE
- MARCH 2, 1978

MR. MINISTER:

- I

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF
CRUISE MISSILE RANGE AND TO REVIEW IN SOME DETAIL THE
SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES IN OUR TWO PROPOSALS.

- II

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03288 01 OF 02 021357Z

THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CONTAINED IN AN
AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE III OF THE
PROTOCOL STATES THAT "THE RANGE CAPABILITY OF A CRUISE
MISSILE SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE THE MAXIMUM SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL RANGE." IT FURTHER STATES THAT MAXIMUM
SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE MEANS "THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE AT

WHICH A TARGET CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGED BY THE MISSILE SYSTEM WHEN IT IS OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE."

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY STATES THAT "THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE IS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE WHICH CAN BE COVERED BY THE MISSILE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE." IT FURTHER STATES THAT THIS DISTANCE "IS DETERMINED BY PROJECTING ITS FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SURFACE."

- III

DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS REGARDING THESE TWO PROPOSALS. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A CERTAIN COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS REGARDING THE MEANING OF THE TERMS "STANDARD DESIGN MODE" AND "STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE." THAT IS, THE TWO SIDES APPARENTLY AGREE THAT THESE TERMS REFER TO THE MANNER IN WHICH CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED TO OPERATE IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS.

FOR EXAMPLE, IF A CRUISE MISSILE WERE DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT A PARTICULAR SPEED, OR COMBINATION OF SPEEDS, AND TO MANEUVER, EITHER IN THE VERTICAL OR HORIZONTAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03288 01 OF 02 021357Z

PLANES OR BOTH, IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ITS TASK, THEN THE RESULTING FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED WOULD BE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF ITS "STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE." IN THIS CONNECTION, THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM IS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING A CRUISE MISSILE'S "STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE."

THE UNITED STATES HAS USED THE PHRASE "FULL-SYSTEM" IN ITS DEFINITION BECAUSE THAT PHRASE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE FACTORS DETERMINING THE ABILITY OF THE CRUISE MISSILE EFFECTIVELY TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK FOR WHICH IT HAS BEEN DESIGNED.

ACCORDINGLY, THERE APPEARS TO BE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE DETERMINED.

- IV

THE MAJOR AREA OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES SEEMS TO BE THE MANNER IN WHICH RANGE IS TO BE MEASURED. UNDER THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES, RANGE WOULD BE

MEASURED AS THE "MAXIMUM DISTANCE AT WHICH A TARGET CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGED." BY THIS WE MEAN THE MAXIMUM GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE, FROM THE LAUNCH POINT OF THE MISSILE TO THE TARGET, AT WHICH THE TARGET CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ATTACKED. THIS DISTANCE WOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF A CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM WHICH IS OPERATING IN ITS "STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE." AFTER THIS DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE EACH CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE A SPECIFIC RANGE CAPABILITY NOT AFFECTED BY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS THE TYPE OF

SECRET

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 03288 02 OF 02 021401Z

ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03288

EXDIS

USSALT TWO

TERRAIN OR OTHER CONDITIONS A MISSILE WOULD ACTUALLY ENCOUNTER ON ANY PARTICULAR OPERATIONAL MISSION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, RANGE WOULD BE MEASURED AS THE PROJECTION OF THE MISSILE'S FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SURFACE. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THIS METHOD OF MEASURING RANGE IS NOT PRECISE, AND IT IS ARBITRARY. IT IS NOT PRECISE BECAUSE, BY THIS METHOD, THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE TERRAIN OVER WHICH THE MISSILE FLEW. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A CRUISE MISSILE WERE OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE, AND ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE WERE A LEVEL FLIGHT PATH, THE LENGTH OF THE PROJECTION OF THE SAME FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SURFACE WOULD BE GREATER OVER UNEVEN TERRAIN THAN OVER FLAT TERRAIN. ACCORDINGLY, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THERE WOULD BE NO

SINGLE VALUE OF RANGE FOR A PARTICULAR CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM, BUT RATHER AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF RANGES, EACH GOVERNED BY A PARTICULAR TYPE OF TERRAIN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03288 02 OF 02 021401Z

THE SOVIET DEFINITION IS ARBITRARY BECAUSE IT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST SYSTEMS WHICH UTILIZE HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN CONTRAST TO SYSTEMS WHICH UTILIZE VERTICAL MANEUVERS. FOR INSTANCE, IF A CRUISE MISSILE WERE DESIGNED TO TRAVEL A CERTAIN GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE OVER A CERTAIN TYPE OF TERRAIN, IT COULD FLY A FLIGHT PATH WHICH INCLUDED VERTICAL MANEUVERS AND BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE THE SAME RANGE AS IF IT HAD FLOWN A LEVEL FLIGHT PATH. THAT IS, THE PROJECTION OF THE TWO FLIGHT PATHS ON THE EARTH'S SURFACE WOULD BE THE SAME. HOWEVER, ANOTHER SYSTEM WHICH EMPLOYS HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS WOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE SOVIET DEFINITION. THUS, ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, UNDER THE SOVIET DEFINITION THE RANGE OF THIS MISSILE WOULD EXCEED THE RANGE OF THE MISSILE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO EMPLOY VERTICAL MANEUVERS. THEREFORE, THE SOVIET APPROACH WOULD APPLY ARBITRARY AND UNEVEN STANDARDS TO THE MEASUREMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE.

- V

MR. MINISTER, TODAY I HAVE DISCUSSED AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES REGARDING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE AND HAVE EXPLAINED THE RATIONALE FOR THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL. I WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR RESPONSE. EARLE

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